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Faculty and Deans

Essays
Affrrmative Action After Reagan
Neal Devins*
Ronald Reagan assumed office at the apparent height of the affirmative action controversy. During the Carter years, the Supreme Court
wrote for the first time about the legality of both public- and privatesector affirmative action. Although these opinions generally approved of
affirmative action, they sent confusing messages: Congress can remedy
proven societal discrimination through a modest set aside; 1 a public university cannot remedy societal discrimination through admissions,
although race can be a factor in admissions decisions; 2 Title VII nondiscrimination requirements do not apply to certain types of private-sector
affirmative action. 3 These rulings were more than ambiguous; they revealed a fractured court. The Justices filed multiple opinions and bitter
dissents in each case. Rather than quieting the affirmative action debate,
these rulings exacerbated the controversy. 4 Consequently, despite three
landmark opinions, the fate of affirmative action remained unsettled.
The Carter Administration was a strong advocate in these cases, arguing that affirmative action was as laudable as it was necessary. 5 In
addition, this Administration pressed affirmative action by enacting regulations governing civil service hiring and federal contracting and by establishing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines. 6
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
The author would like to thank Tad Pethybridge for his exceptional assistance in the preparation of
this Essay.
1. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980) (upholding a congressional spending
program requiring ten percent of federal funds granted for local public works projects to be used to
procure services or supplies from minority-owned businesses).
2. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
3. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979).
4. When the Court wants to quiet the controversy about a divisive issue, it takes steps to speak
in a unanimous voice. In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 433 (1954), for example, the
Justices made numerous compromises to ensure that the Court's opinion would be unanimous. See
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68
GEO. L.J. I, I (1979); Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. PoL. 689, 690 (1971).
5. See Brief for Secretary of Commerce at 14, Fullilove (No. 78-1007); Brief for United States
at 16, Weber (No. 78-432); Brief for United States at 6, Bakke (No. 76-811).
6. See, e.g., Clark, Affirmative Action May Fall Victim to Reagan's Regulatory Reform Drive,
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In 1980, presidential candidate Reagan challenged the Carter affirmative action initiatives. Whereas the 1980 Democratic platform asserted that "[a]n effective affirmative action program is an essential
component of our commitment to expanding civil rights protections,"7
the Republican platform argued that "equal opportunity should not be
jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to exclude some individuals in
favor of others, thereby rendering such regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory." 8
Once in office, however, the Reagan Administration's pursuit of its
equal opportunity platform proved far from clear. The Administration
opposed the Civil Rights Restoration Act,9 proposals for changes in voting rights, 10 and amendments to fair-housing legislationll-positions
that evidenced lts lack of support for stronger civil rights enforcement. 12
13 NAT'L J. 1248, 1249-52 (1981) (noting that during the Carter Administration, regulations were
passed barring employers from terminating workers on disability leaves for pregnancy as well as
requiring extra minority recruitment efforts to be expended by agencies with few minorities or women); Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456,
488-97 (noting that during the Carter Administration the IRS proposed a change in the tax laws to
deny tax-exempt status to private schools with "insignificant" numbers of minority students); Finn,
"Affirmative Action" Under Reagan, COMMENTARY, Apr. 1982, at 17, 18-20 (reporting that the
Carter Administration imposed on the federal government a strict quota system for hiring
minorities).
7. 1980 Democratic Platform, reprinted in D. JOHNSON, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS,
!840-1976, at 60 (Supp. 1980).
8. 1980 Republican Platform, reprinted in D. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 182.
9. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1687). This
legislation was designed to nullify the Supreme Court's determination that federal civil rights legislation extends only to the direct recipient of federal funds and not to the entire institution of which
that recipient is a part. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571 (1984). President Reagan
vetoed this legislation, claiming that it would "vastly and unjustifiably expand the power of the
Federal government over the decisions and affairs of private organizations." Message to the Senate
on Civil Rights Legislation, 24 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 353, 353 (Mar. 16, 1988). Congress
overrode this veto. See 134 CoNG. REc. Hl072, S2765 (daily ed. March 22, 1988).
10. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). To ease plaintiffs' burden, Congress amended the 1965
Voting Rights Act to make disparate racial impact probative of discriminatory motivation. The
Administration initially opposed the bill, claiming that it would "likely lead to the widespread restructuring by Federal courts of electoral procedures and systems." SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON VOTING RIGHTS ACT 39 (Comm. Print 1982) (quoting
testimony of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights); see also
Pear, Reagan Backs Voting Rights Act but Wants to Ease Requirements, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981,
at AI, col. 3 (noting Reagan's opposition to a simple effects test to prove discrimination). After
substantial pressure from the Republican leadership of Congress, Reagan endorsed voting rights
amendments that made some use of evidence of bad effects. See Remarks on Signing the Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, PUB. PAPERS 822-23 (June 29, 1982).
II. See Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3617). Indeed, during the signing ceremony, President Reagan
expressed dissatisfaction with effects-based tests of fair housing violations and emphasized that fair
housing laws speak "only to intentional discrimination." Remarks on Signing the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1140, 1141 (Sept. 13, 1988).
12. The Administration's initiative to restore the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory
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At the same time, however, the Administration left in place several of its
predecessor's most controversial programs and policies. For example,
the "Reagan Revolution" did not bring with it changes in Executive Order 11,246, which requires affirmative action by government contractors. 13 The Administration, moreover, did not alter either Small
Business Administration and other Executive-initiated set-aside programsi4 or EEOC guidelines providing for an inference of adverse impact
whenever the "utilization" of women and minorities is less than eighty
percent of their "availability."I 5
In sharp contrast to this regulatory inaction, I6 the Reagan Justice
Department quickly took steps to limit race-conscious affirmative action.
As Civil Rights Division head William Bradford Reynolds testified in
1981:
We no longer will insist upon or in any respect support the use of
quotas or any other numerical or statistical formula designed to
provide to nonvictims of discrimination preferential treatment ....
. . . Separate treatment of people in the field of ~mployment,
based on nothing more than personal characteristics of race or gender, is as offensive to standards of human decency today as it was
private schools also raised doubts about its commitment to antidiscrimination principles. See
Devins, supra note 6, at 494-95. For a comprehensive, critical review of Reagan-era civil rights
policy, seeN. AMAKER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 32-163 (1988).
13. See Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e app. at 28 (1982). The Reagan Administmtion did consider eliminating this contract compliance progmm. After the Supreme Court ruled in 1986 that affirmative action could serve as
appropriate compensation for past discrimination, Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
274 (1986), however, the Administration decided not to change contract compliance requirements.
See Boyd, Goals for Hiring to Stay in Place, N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1986, at A1, col. 5.
14. See generally Levinson, A Study ofPreferential Treatment: The Evolution ofMinority Business Enterprise Assistance Programs, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 61, 64-98 (1980) (discussing the history and effectiveness of various Minority Business Enterprise set-aside programs). The Reagan
Administration, surprisingly, was a vocal supporter of federal minority set-aside programs. See
Pear, Administration Challenges Plan by Rights Panel, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1986, at A1, col. 2.
15. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4D (1988).
16. I use inaction rather than acquiescence because the Administration seriously considered
changing several of these programs. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text. Conservatives
severely criticized the Administration for its failure to develop a comprehensive approach to affirmative action. As Chester E. Finn, Jr. remarked:
Whither civil rights under Ronald Reagan? As with foreign affairs, it seems to depend
more than it shonld on what day it is, who is in charge of a particular decision, what
constituency is raising the loudest ruckus, and which agency is responsible for formulating
the alternatives and executing the decision. The most ideological administration in recent
history seems not to have its ideas sorted out ....
Finn, supra note 6, at 28. The civil rights community saw things much differently. See, e.g., N.
AMAKER, supra note 12, at 157 (remarking that the Bork nomination was opposed by civil rights
advocates who had witnessed an "assault on affirmative action remedies" during the Reagan Administmtion). CITIZENS' COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DOORS OF
JoB OPPORTUNITY 90-120 (1984) (assailing the weakening of affirmative action enforcement by various executive departments and agencies).
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some 84 years ago when countenanced under Plessy v. Ferguson
17

With the close of the 1988 Supreme Court Term, it is now possible to
assess the Reagan Administration's success in advancing its absolutist
goals of "color blindness" through the courts.
The assessment is a mixed story. Of greatest significance, Reagan
Administration efforts to entirely discredit race and sex preferences have
clearly failed. Over the past few years, the Court has validated a range of
hiring and promotion schemes that benefit nonvictims. 18 At the same
time, however, the Court has barred nonremedial set asides and layoffs of
senior nonminority employees. 19
Because of the contentiousness and symbolic importance of affirmative action, the Court's jurisprudence on this issue does not lend itself to
blanket generalizations. Indeed, as Justice Jackson commented in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,2° "court decisions are indecisive
because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in
the most nar:row way." 21 Judicial patchwork then is the norm, and affirmative action is no exception.
Nonetheless, headlines like "Court Affirmative Action Decision
Says Little" or "Court Both Clarifies and Confuses Its Position on Affirmative Action" make poor copy. 22 Not surprisingly, the popular and
academic press generally view each affirmative action opinion to be of
great historical moment. A comparison of the media's treatment of the
17. Oversight Hearings on Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action, 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, at 134, 137 (1981) (statement of William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights); see also Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of
Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 998-1001 (1984) (advocating race neutrality over racial preferences as a
more effective means of protecting individual rights).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42 (1987) (approving preference for minority and women employees seeking promotion); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S.
149, 166-67 (1987) (holding that the Constitution does not absolutely prohibit court-ordered raceconscious relief); Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,530
(1986) (approving entry of consent decree providing temporary race-conscious hiring and promotion); Loca128 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,453 (1986) (holding
that Title VII does not absolutely prohibit court-ordered, race-conscious relief).
19. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that race-conscious set asides must be based on particularized discrimination and must
be narrowly tailored); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (holding that
remedying societal discrimination cannot justify granting preferences under the Constitution);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 575 (1984) (holding that nonvictim relief
cannot disrupt seniority rights under Title VII).
20. 343 u.s. 579 (1952).
21. /d. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
22. Cf. Greenhouse, Bias Remedy vs. Seniority, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1984, at A17, col. I ("In
case after case over the last decade, the Supreme Court has walked gingerly through the minefield of
affirmative action, always emerging with some questions answered and many more left for another
day.").
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final two Reagan-era decisions, Johnson v. Transportation Agency23 and
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 24 illuminate this phenomenon.
The Supreme Court held in Johnson that a county agency could promote a female over a marginally better qualified male to help alleviate sex
imbalance in a job category. Most observers believed that the case had
largely settled the thorny question of the permissibility of affirmative action programs. Press reaction was quick and unanimous. Although media accounts took varying editorial positions on the wisdom of the
decision, the accounts invariably portrayed the decision as extremely important and far reaching. United Press International, the Los Angeles
Times, and Reuters, for example, all described the decision as either
"landmark" or "historic." 25 Two major newspapers went even further in
their characterizations: the Washington Post called the decision the
Court's "broadest endorsement yet of affirmative action programs,"26
and the New York Times called it the "most sweeping endorsement ever
of special preferences."27
Such ringing pronouncements were not confined to lay commentators. The National Law Journal, echoing a theme of most media accounts, called the decision a "near-deathblow"28 to the Reagan
Administration's view of affirmative action programs. The Washington
Post quoted a representative of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law: "All the broad que8tions have now been answered." 29 Professor Herman Schwartz agreed, 30 asserting that "[at least for now] the
affirmative action wars are over," 31 with most of the conflict's issues "answered in a way favorable to the supporters of race- and gender-con23. 480 u.s. 616 (1987).
24. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). After Croson, the Supreme Court ruled in Martin v. Wil/cs-a case

argued during the Reagan era-that nonintervening white firefighters could challenge race-conscious consent decree provisions. 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2184 (1989). Ostensibly, Martin involves nonparty rights, not the legality of affirmative action. For a discussion of Martin's impact on
affirmative action, see infra notes 60, 82.
25. Reske, UPI, Mar. 25, 1987, AM Cycle, Washington News; Savage, High Court Backs Women in Historic Ruling on Jobs, L.A. Times, Mar. 25, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Vicini, Major High Court
Ruling Upholds Affirmative Action for Women, Reuters, Mar. 25, 1987, AM Cycle.
26. Kamen, Supreme Court Upholds Affirmative Action Hiring, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at
AI, col. 4.
27. Taylor, Court's Change of Course: New Affirmative Action Ruling Culminates Broad Rejection of Administration's Stance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1987, at AI, col. 4.
28. Coyle, Administration Loses Major Round on Reverse Bias, Nat'! L.J., Apr. 6, 1987, at 5,
col. I.
29. Marcus, Many Remedies Now Sanctioned: Decisiou Completes a Cycle of Job Discrimination Cases, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at AI, col. 5 (quoting Richard T. Seymour).
30. See Schwartz, The 1986 and 1987 Affirmative Action Cases: It's All Over but the Shouting,
86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 524-25 (1987).
31. Id. at 524.
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scious action." 32 In fact, Schwartz announced that only "inevitable loose
ends" and "peripheral issues remain[ed]." 33
The 1989 Croson decision indicates that Johnson-spurred reports of
the death of the Reagan Justice Department position were premature~ In
Croson the Supreme Court held that a municipal set-aside plan is unconstitutional unless it benefits only members of racial groups arguably discriminated against by the city itself. 34 Although the earlier
commentators correctly concluded that "the effort to kill affirmative action programs has failed," 35 Croson reveals that this failure does not
mean that affirmative action has prevailed.
Having miscalculated Johnson's importance, commentators might
have been more circumspect in their assessment of Croson. Instead, they
again issued sweeping pronouncements about the opinion's importance. 36
Editorials and columns in the Washington Post, New York Times, and
Wall Street Journal discussed the "dangers" of Croson,3 7 characterized
the decision as "a severe, perhaps fatal blow to local minority setaside[s]"38 and "the hardest blow yet against government racial preference,"39 concluded that "exacting standards" have now been set for affirmative action's "passing constitutional muster," 40 and condemned the
Court for "drawing a narrower and narrower circle-a noose-around
any government action that is race-conscious." 41 Even Professor
Schwartz joined this ominous chorus, characterizing Croson as " 'just the
beginning.' " 42
The commentators' descriptions of Johnson and Croson suggest that
· the Supreme Court's affirmative action rulings resemble a swinging pendulum, one day approving of broad affirmative action regardless of past
discrimination, the next day demanding victim-specific relief. The votes
32. /d. at 525.
33. /d.
34. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 727 (1989) (plurality opinion).
35. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 576 (emphasis added).
36. Cf Greenhouse, Signal on Job Rights, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1989, at AI, cols. 4-5 ("In
declaring unconstitutional the effort by Richmond to increase opportunities for blacks in the construction industry, the Supreme Court did not declare an end to government-sponsored affirmative
action programs.").
37. Raspberry, The "Set-Aside" Reversal: Theory over Practice, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1989, at
A9, coL 1.
38. Koch, Equal Opportunity-Without Minority Set-Asides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1989, at
A19, coL 2.
39. Gigot, Supreme Court: An Emerging Case of Poetic Justice, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1989, at
Al4, col. 3.
40. Setback for Set-Asides, Wash. Post, Jan. 24, 1989, at A22, col. 1.
41. Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1989, at A25, coL 5.
42. Coyle, Reagan Legacy Is Alive and Well at High Court, Nat'! L.J., Feb. 6, 1989, at 5, coL 1
(quoting Professor Herman Schwartz).
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of individual Justices provide additional support for this conclusion. Six
Justices joined in both Johnson and Croson; therefore, Justice Kennedy's
replacement of Justice Powell cannot explain the swing between the two
cases.
The pendulum analogy, however, is also inaccurate. Supreme Court
decision making is incremental rather than schizophrenic. Consequently, as Justice Jackson cautioned, overgeneralizations make little
sense. 43 Johnson and other so-called broad affirmative action pronouncements are much narrower than the commentators' interpretations of
them. By the same token, the applicability of Croson is much narrower
than critics predict.
This Essay argues that the Supreme Court's recent work in affirmative action is neither far reaching nor clear cut. The argument is divided
into two parts. Part I considers the Court's 1986 decision in Local No.
93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland. 44 Part
II, in turn, considers the Court's 1987 decision in Johnson. Parts I and II
together argue that Local 93 and Johnson are examples of issue avoidance rather than examples of sweeping and definitive pronouncements.
The configuration of these cases ultimately casts doubt upon the sweep of
other affirmative action rulings.
Part III demonstrates that narrow decisions cut both ways.
Although Local 93 and Johnson are less sweeping than they were portrayed by the commentators, Croson does not spell defeat for affirmative
action programs. The Croson Court's primary objection to the Richmond set aside is its arbitrariness. 45 Indeed, Croson suggests that a more
carefully crafted set-aside plan may pass constitutional muster.
The questions left undecided by the affirmative action cases, as well
as the unusual grounds for decision in some of them, suggest that the
complex issue of affirmative action is far from settled. In fact, the vagaries of these rulings now seem especially important. President Bush's
commitment to appoint judges " 'who view judging as a matter of interpreting the law, ... not making it' " 46 suggests that federal judges may
narrowly construe Reagan-era affirmative action rulings. This Essay ex43. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (cautioning
against reliance on "generalized approbations of freedom of speech with which, in the abstract, no
one will disagree"); Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 65 (1948) (Jackson, J.) ("such generalizations,
useful enough, perhaps, in solving some problem of a particular case, are not rules of law to be
applied to all cases, with or without reason").
44. 478 U.S. 501 (1986). The Court held in Local 93 that Title VII consent decrees may pro·
vide relief for minorities who have not been victims of discrimination. /d. at 530.
45. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 725-26 (1989) (plurality opinion).
46. Kamen & Marcus, A Chance to Deepen Stamp on Courts, Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 1989, at A 1,
col. 4 (quoting White House Counsel Boyden Gray).
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amines how these cases form a mosaic in which the whole is considerably
less than the sum of its parts.
I.

Local 93: What About Title VII?

A.

The Supreme Court Opinion

In Local 93 the Court held that a public or private employer may
develop an affirmative action hiring and promotion plan in settling employment discrimination lawsuits governed by Title VII. 47 Specifically,
Local 93 validates a court-approved settlement agreement between the
city of Cleveland and an association of black and Hispanic firefighters. 48
The decree provides that the city must promote minority and nonminority candidates on an alternating basis to fill sixty-six lieutenant positions. The decree also specifies that after filling these positions, the city,
using out-of-turn promotions if necessary, must ensure that twenty-five
percent of its new lieutenants are members of minority groups.
The predominantly white firefighters' union49 and the United States
challenged the decree as inconsistent with section 706(g) of Title VII.
That section provides that no court order shall extend relief to an individual "if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled,
... for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin." 50 The union, characterizing a consent
decree entered and approved by a court as the functional equivalent of a
court order, claimed that Title VII remedial provisions bar consent decrees that benefit nondiscriminatees. 51
The Court, however, did not actually decide whether: the settlement
agreement was outside the bounds of permissible court-ordered Title VII
relief. Instead, it ruled that for Title VII purposes, the consent decree
was identical to a private out-of-court settlement. 52 Although the Court
recognized that consent decrees possess "the legal force and character of
judgment[s]" 53 and bear the "earmarks ofjudgments," 54 it found disposi47. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
48. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515. For the procedural history of the case, see id. at 504-15.
49. The union was allowed to voice its objections to the district court before entry of the decree.
See id. at 529.
50. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 259 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982)).
51. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 514.
52. /d. at 517-18.
53. /d. at 518.
54. /d. at 519. Specifically, (1) a consent decree is entered as a judgment based on a judicial
finding ofits'propriety, (2) a court maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree and may
modify its· term~ over signatory objections, and (3) noncompliance with a consent decree is enforceable by a contempt citation. See id. at 523. See generally Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation
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tive portions of Title VII's legislative history that emphasize the avoidance of undue federal intervention and the preservation of management
prerogatives. 55 The Court thus concluded that Local 93 was indistinguishable from its 1979 decision in United Steelworkers v. Weber, 56 which
allowed a private employer to voluntarily adopt a race-conscious plan to
increase minority employment.
By holding that "the parties' consent animates the legal force of the
consent decree," 57 the Court further ruled that a decree itself need not be
in conformity with the underlying statute. Indeed, the Court emphasized
that a federal court should not refrain from entering a consent decree
"merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could
have awarded after a trial." 58
By treating a consent decree as a contract between the signatories,
the Court left affected third parties, including intervenors by right, with
virtually no power to challenge the appropriateness of decree provisions.
The Court asserted that nonconsenting intervenors may raise valid
claims in a separate action. 5 9 The Court specified, however, that the possibility that decree provisions may violate intervenor or nonparty rights
should not bar a court from entering a settlement agreement. 60 Local 93
ofConsent Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 584-89 (explaining the characteristics and purposes of consent decrees); Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness ofNegotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J.
887, 929-30 (advocating a systematic procedure to provide fair hearings before entering consent
decrees).
55. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 501-24.
56. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). For further discussion of Weber, see infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
57. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 525.
58. /d. Local 93 conceded, however, that a "federal court is more than a 'recorder of contracts.'" /d. (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880)). Specifically, the Court
acknowledged that a court could enter and enforce such an agreement only "to the extent that the
consent decree is not otherwise shown to be unlawful." /d. at 526. This limitation is important with
respect to contracts with federal executive agencies. See generally Rabkin & Devins, Averting Govemment by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 209-19 (1987) (discussing the constitutional limitations on
contracts with federal executive agencies).
59. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 530.
60. See id. This feature of the decision is quite controversial. First, as George Rutherglen and
Daniel Ortiz point out, the union's failure to raise a specific objection to the decree in the district
court might foreclose its opportunity to bring such an action. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, Affirmative
Action Under the Constitution and Title VII: From Confusion to Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REV.
467, 477 (1988). Second, as Douglas Laycock observes: "[A] decree in which A and B agree to
transfer the arguable rights of Cis not a consent decree unless C also consents." Laycock, Conse11t
Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103,
104. For Laycock, "neither violation nor remedy may be adjudicated without notice and hearing for
the parties to be bound.'' /d. For a contrasting view, see Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of
Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 335-38 (1988) (proposing a method for including third-party
claims in consent decree proceeding).
Concerns that Local 93 would foreclose adversely affected nonparty claims have been assuaged
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therefore speaks only to the authority of a court to enter a consent decree
without violating Title VII remedial provisions. Although the Court acknowledged that the decree might ultimately be inconsistent either with
Title VII, 61 or with the fourteenth amendment, the Court considered
these prospects irrelevant to the disposition of the case.62

B.

The Opinion in Context

Local 93 says very little about the line separating permissible from
impermissible affirmative action. By reserving the question of thirdparty rights and with it the ultimate legality of the decree, "the Court
narrowed its holding almost to the vanishing point." 63 Indeed, Professor
Schwartz characterizes Local 93 as "the least controversial [affirmative
action] decision, for it was the most limited." 64
A comparison of Local 93 to other affirmative action decisions,
however, makes Schwartz's conclusion less convincing. On the same day
the Court decided Local93, it ruled in Local28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. EEOC 65 that court-ordered Title VII relief may extend to nondiscriminatees. 66 Sheet Metal Workers' therefore
suggests that the Court could have held that the Local 93 consent decree
was within the court's permissible range of remedial authority under Title VII. Instead, by basing its holding on the contractual nature of consent decrees, the Local 93 Court took great pains to "emphasize that ...
nothing we say here is intended to express a view as to the extent of a
court's [Title VII] remedy power." 67
Local 93's assiduous avoidance of the remedial authority issue is
troublesome. First, the Court transformed a rather simple case into a
fairly complex one. The Court needed only point to the remedial authorby Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). In holding that an affirmative action settlement entered
by consent decree is open to challenge by employee groups not parties to the original settlement, the
Court concluded that any public policy in favor of voluntary affirmative action must give way to
"our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.'" /d. at 2184
(quoting 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4449,
at 417 (1981)). Moreover, the Court adopted the view of Justice Stevens and defined "adversely
affected" to include individuals deprived ofvested legal rights as well as individuals denied an opportunity to compete equally for available job opportunities. See id. at 2188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Thus, affirmative action plans that guarantee minorities some share of job and promotion opportunities cannot be insulated from nonparty challenge.
61. Title VII prohibits "discriminat[ion] ... because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
62. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 530. The Court also noted that the consent decree might also be
challenged as a breach of contract. See id.
63. Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 476.
64. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 532.
65. 478 u.s. 421 (1986).
66. ld. at 482.
67. Local 93, 478 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added).
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ity holding of Sheet Metal Workers' to establish the validity of the Local
93 consent decree. If Title VII remedies may benefit nondiscriminatees,
it simply does not matter whether a consent decree must conform to the
underlying statute or whether it is a private contract not subject to Title
VII strictures.
Second, Local 93's conclusions that the underlying statute is irrelevant and that consent decrees are private contracts conflict with prior
Court rulings. The 1984 decision Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v.
Stotts 68 indicates that "'[t]he District Court's authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute which the decree is intended to
enforce,' not from the parties' consent to the decree." 69 In Stotts, the
Court concluded that a consent decree must conform to the underlying
statute, which "necessarily act[s] as a limit" on court authority. 7 ° Consequently, in rejecting the lower court's modification of a consent decree
that abridged bona fide seniority rights to further the decree's affirmative
action objectives, the Court noted that neither "the terms of the decree
[nor] notions of equity" can displace the underlying statute. 71
Stotts' equating of consent decrees with judicial orders is emblematic
of Supreme Court jurisprudence governing the modification of consent
decrees. 72 Local 93 does not dispute this interpretation; instead, Local 93
limits Stotts-and with it the underlying statute-to instances where the
parties disagree. 73 This distinction, however, ignores language in Stotts
and other Court rulings indicating that judicial authority "to adopt a
consent_ decree comes only from the statute." 74
Local 93's conclusion that judicial entry of a consent decree is
strictly ministerial is, at the least, subject to debate. Why does the Court
68. 467 u.s. 561 (1984).
69. /d. at 576 n.9 (quoting Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961)); see also id.
at 588 n.2 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding "persuasive" the Court's reliance on the statutory
source of the district court's authority as justification for using Title VII in its analysis).
70. /d. at 576 n.9.
71. /d.
72. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 523
(1986) (conceding that consent decrees, like judicial orders, may be subject to later modification by
the court); Columbia Artists Management Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348, 352 (1965) (noting
that the Court had allowed modifications of consent decrees in the past upon "a showing of changed
circumstances"). Stotts was extremely controversial for its suggestion that the policy underlying
Title VII "is to provide make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal
discrimination." Stotts, 467 U.S. at 580 (emphasis added). Sheet Metal Workers' limited this suggestion to the facts of Stotts-non victim relief that disrupts a bona fide seniority plan. See Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers' lnt'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 473-74 (1986).
73. See Local 93, 478 U.S. at 527-28.
74. Stotts, 467 U.S. at 576 n.9 (emphasis added); see Railway Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S.
642, 651 (1961); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (holding that "a
court does not abdicate its power to revoke or modify its mandate" regardless of"whether the decree
has been entered after litigation or by consent").
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not simply rely on Sheet Metal Workers' to demonstrate that Title VII
relief may extend to nondiscriminatees?
The answer lies in Sheet Metal Workers'. That case involved "long
continued and egregious racial discrimination" and "foot-dragging resistance"75 to judicial efforts to enjoin blatant intentional discrimination
against minorities. After twenty years of union nonacquiescence to state
and federal court orders, which culminated federal contempt citations,76
the federal court in 1983 established a 29.23 percent minority membership goal. 77 Although this membership goal extended benefits to nondiscriminatees, a majority of the Justices concluded that "such relief may be
appropriate where an employer or labor union has engaged in persistent
or egregious discrimination. " 78 In so ruling, the Court explicitly rejected
Department of Justice efforts to transform Stotts into an absolute prohibition of nonvictim relief. 79

Sheet Metal Workers', however, does not define "persistent or egregious discrimination." If restricted to situations as abominable as Sheet
Metal Workers', the exception to Title VII's policy of favoring victimspecific relief would be very limited indeed. In Local 93, the Court declined the opportunity to extend Sheet Metal Workers' beyond its facts.
By emphasizing the nonjudicial character of consent judgments, the
Court simply concludes that it "need not decide whether this is one of
those cases" where nonvictim relief is appropriate. 80
In the end, although it rejects Reagan Administration efforts to
75. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 477.
76. See id. at 427-36.
77. I d. at 437. For the procedural history of the case, see id. at 427-40.
78. Jd. at 445. Sheet Metal Workers' was a 4-1-4 plurality opinion. Justice Powell cast the
decisive vote. He agreed with only this feature of the plurality's reasoning. See id. at 483 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
Because judicial action is state action, judicial imposition of race-conscious relief may need to
satisfy the demands of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. In addition to this Title VII
ruling, Sheet Metal Workers' concludes that the union's hiring order satisfied strict scrutiny review.
The plurality found the remedial order "narrowly tailored to further the Government's compelling
interest in remedying past discrimination." I d. at 480. The Court employed the identical analysis in
United States v. Paradise to uphold a lower court order requiring the Alabama State Troopers to
employ a one-black-for-one-white promotion scheme to remedy "pervasive, systematic, and obstinate discriminatory conduct-" 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987).
Before a court may order su.ch "affirmative" relief, however, it must find persistent, ongoing
discrimination. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 408 (1986). In Bazemore, five Justices concluded that present racial imbalance in the face of prior intentional discrimination is an inadequate
basis to support "affirmative" relief. See id. at 407-09 (White, J., concurring). Consequently, the
Court did not require North Carolina, which had discontinued its segregated club policy in favor of
a freedom-of-choice plan twenty years earlier, to remedy racial imbalance in state-supported 4-H and
homemakers clubs. See id. at 407-08.
79. See Brief for the United States at 7-11, Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986) (No. 84-1999).
80. Sheet Metal Workers', 478 U.S. at 515.
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limit consent decree reliefto victims ofdiscrimination, 81 Local93 reveals
precious little about the scope of permissible affirmative action remedies.
The Court's responses to third-party challenges based either on Title VII
or the fourteenth amendment will ultimately define that scope. Because
the Supreme Court earlier ruled in Weber that employers may voluntarily adopt race-conscious hiring plans that favor nondiscriminatees, Local 93 does not substantially enhance employer discretion to give
preferences to nonvictims. 82 Since the opinion rests on a debatable assessment of the legal status of consent judgments, however, Local 93 suggests that the broad remedial relief countenanced in Sheet Metal
Workers' may be limited to pervasive, egregious discrimination.
II.

Johnson: What About the Constitution?

A.

The Supreme Court Opinion

In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 83 the Supreme Court ruled
that Title VII does not prohibit public employers from voluntarily adopting affirmative action plans. Specifically, the Court upheld a plan that
authorized consideration of the sex and race of qualified applicants for
openings in traditionally segregated job categories. 84 The Johnson Court
thus approved Santa Clara County's decision to promote Diane Joyce, a
well-qualified female applicant, to the position of road dispatcher over
Paul Johnson, an arguably better qualified male applicant. 85
The Court found Weber to be controlling, despite the fact that, un81. See Brief for the United States at 12-20, Local 93 (No. 84-1999).
82. Local 93's consent decree should not be equated with Weber's voluntary contract. Consent
decrees, by sharing many of the attributes of judicial orders, enable the entering court to ensure the
satisfaction of decree objectives. Local93 recognizes these virtues. See Local93, 478 U.S. at 523-24.
In response to third-party challenges, the Supreme Court may limit consent decrees to what a court
could order had the case gone to trial. Otherwise, employers will subject themselves both to consent
decree obligations and to third-party liability.
This lesson is apparent in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (I 989). By enabling a broad class of
nonminorities to challenge consent decree provisions as inconsistent with Title VII or with equal
protection, Martin forecloses Local 93's prospect of nonreviewability. See supra note 60. Weber's
approval of voluntary preferences established outside of litigation, therefore, may serve as the outer
limit of employer discretion. For a discussion of Weber's impact on voluntary preferences in the
public sector, see infra Part II.
83. This Essay's analysis of Johnson differs substantially from an analysis I prepared for the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, where I served as Assistant General Counsel from 19841987. See Williams, Rights Panel Rejects a Statement Assailing High Court Jobs Ruling, N.Y. Times,
May 16, 1987, at AI, col. 5; Pear, Rights Panel Assails High Court for Sanctioning Job Preferences,
N.Y. Times, May 14, 1987, at AI, col. I. The statement that allegedly, among other things, criticized Johnson as an unjustifiable extension of Weber represented the views of the agency's Office of
General Counsel. See Williams, supra; Pear, supra. As this Essay's analysis reveals, I believe that
Johusou is little more than a reaffirmation of Weber. See infra text accompanying notes 106-27.
84. See Johnso11, 480 U.S. at 630, 640-42.
85. See id. at 623-24, 662-64.
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like Weber, Johnson involved a public employer that was subject to constitutional strictures. 86 The Court concluded that since the
constitutional issue was not previously "raised or addressed," it would
consider only "the prohibitory scope of Title VII." 87 By viewing as distinct the constitutional and statutory issues, the Court recognized that
Title VII might countenance conduct otherwise prohibited by the Constitution. 88 The Court, therefore, did not consider analytically relevant its
1986 decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 89 which set forth
criteria for constitutional evaluation of affirmative action plans undertaken by public employers. 9o
Santa Clara County adopted its affirmative action plan because the
"mere prohibition of discriminatory practices" was inadequate to correct
underrepresentation of women and minorities caused by societal discrimination.91 The plan's long-term objective was to make the County Transportation Agency's workforce match the composition by sex and race of
the county's workforce. 92 The plan therefore represented the county's
voluntary commitment to equal employment opportunity rather than its
attempt to remedy the effects of its own discriminatory practices. The
district court concluded that sex was the "determining factor" in Joyce's
promotion. 93 The Supreme Court majority, however, in concluding that
the promotion did not violate Title VII, characterized the county's affirmative action efforts as "modest." 94 Noting that "[a]ny differences in
86. See id. at 651. Four Justices, however, disagreed with this feature of the majority's ruling.
See id. at 648-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices
Rehnquist and White).
87. Id. at 620 n.2
88. For the Court, "[t]he fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not
negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." Id. at 628 n.6. This statement is counterintuitive. As Rutherglen and Ortiz argue:
[G]overnment preferences for the benefit of minorities should not be closely scrutinized because there is no need for the judiciary to protect the majority from itself.... By
contrast, private employers are more likely to use preferences to avoid liability to individual victims of discrimination ... [and therefore] may not give much weight to the interests
of the employees . . . who bear the cost of the preference.... If this is true, voluntary
preferences under Title VII should be subject to a higher, not a lower, standard of justification than voluntary preferences under the Constitution.
Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 507-08; see also Schwartz, supra note 30, at 540-42 (arguing
that Title VII requirements must be at least as high as constitutional requirements).
89. 476 u.s. 267 (1986).
90. See id. at 273-84. Johnson, however, did indicate that the Wygant criteria would govern a
constitutional assessment of the plan. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2.
91. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620.
92. See id. at 621.
93. Id. at 625 (quoting the district court).
94. I d. at 636. In stark contrast, the dissent viewed the plan as draconian. For the dissent, the
plan "imposed racial and sexual tailoring that would ... give each protected racial and sexual group
a governmentally determined 'proper' proportion of each job category." I d. at 660 (Scalia, J., dis-
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qualifications between Johnson and Joyce were minimal, to say the
least," 95 the majority concluded that the sex of Joyce was "but one of
numerous factors" 96 in the promotion decision. Indeed, the majority
suggested that the Santa Clara plan was analogous to the sort of raceconscious behavior allowable under Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 97 which allows group status to be considered along with
other criteria. 98 Furthermore, the Court noted that the plan applies only
when the "[a]gency has identified a conspicuous imbalance in job categories traditionally segregated by race and sex" 99 and "it anticipated only
gradual increases in the representation of minorities and women."! 00
The majority therefore found the plan well within the bounds of
Weber's acceptable affirmative action. The Court explained that the
county's plan, like the collective bargaining agreement in Weber, was a
"voluntary affirmative action plan designed to 'eliminate manifest racial
imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories.' " 101 The Weber
Court found this plan unobtrusive in its response to imbalance and therefore consistent with Title VII's objective of encouraging voluntary efforts
to "break down old patterns of ... segregation." 102 By Weber's standards, Johnson is an easy case. 103 The Weber agreement called for a rigid
senting); see also id. at 658-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the structure of the plan and the
findings at trial).
95. ld. at 641 n.17.
96. ld. at 638.
97. 438 u.s. 265, 316-19 (1978).
98. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. In drawing this comparison, the majority did not suggest that
Bakke should govern the constitutionality of the plan. See id.
99. ld. at 640.
100. /d. at 639. Indeed, prior to the Joyce hire, "none of the 238 [skilled craft] positions was
occupied by a woman." ld. at 636.
101. Id. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)). Commentators have criticized the Weber opinion for misrepresenting the facts surrounding the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Morris, New Light 011 Racial Affirmative Action, 20 U. CAL DAVIS L.
REV. 219, 228 (1986) (noting that the employer had engaged in prior discrimination and might have
forfeited lucrative government contracts without an affirmative action plan); Schatzki, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber: An Exercise ill Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51, 73
n.56 (1980) (criticizing the Court's failure to mention that if Kaiser had never instituted the affirmative action apprenticeship plan, Weber would "never have been employed as a skilled craftsman").
First, the plan was the direct outgrowth of Kaiser Aluminum's failure to meet affirmative action
obligations of government contractors. Indeed, the Weber district court found that the desire to
"retain lucrative government contracts" was the impetus behind the Weber plan. Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 226 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Second, rather than responding to imbalances caused by societal discrimination, the plan responded to the union's purposeful discrimination. In fact, the Supreme
Court noted that "(J1udicial findings of exclusion from crafts on racial grounds are so numerous as to
make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial notice." Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.l. Pointing to
these factors, the Reagan Administration argued that Weber approved only the remedial use of
affirmative action. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13-17, Johuson
(No. 85-1129).
102. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
103. Johnson's insistence that a manifest imbalance be more than a simple comparison of the
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one-for-one promotion scheme, 104 whereas the Santa Clara plan (as described by the Johnson majority) envisions "only gradual increases" in
minority representation by considering group status as ''but one of numerous factors." 105
B.

The Opinion in Context

Johnson, although described as "the most sweeping and definitive of
the Court's affirmative action opinions," 106 is little more than a reaffirmation of Weber. In light of Reagan Administration efforts to discredit
Weber or recast the Weber plan as remedial, 107 that reaffrrmation is significant. Yet, by ducking the critical constitutional issue, the Court in
Johnson did little to extend the existing scope of permissible voluntary
affirmative action. Indeed, as Professor Schwartz admits, "[i]f the constitutional standards for voluntary plans are significantly more stringent
than the statutory requirements, affrrmative action hiring and promotion
plans by many public agencies remain under a constitutional cloud." 108
At first blush, the Court's refusal to extend constitutional norms to
public-sector Title VII actions is surprising. The majority is surely correct in recognizing that Title VII is grounded in the commerce clause
and not in the fourteenth amendment; 109 however, as Justice Scalia asserts in dissent, "it is most unlikely that Title VII was intended to place
a lesser restraint on discrimination by public actors than is established by
the Constitution."llO
employer's skiiied craft workers with the general labor force, see Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638, is more
exacting than Weber. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 60, at 480. Moreover, Johnson's analysis
of the Weber requirements that white employee interests not be unnecessarily trammeled and that
the plan be temporary is more thorough than Weber itself. Compare Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638 (explaining that non-minority rights were not trammeled where an affirmative action plan used sex as a
consideration, but adding that a specific timetable might be necessary where such a plan employs
rigid quotas) with Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09 (holding that the interests of white workers were not
trammeled where the affirmative action plan was temporary and did not mandate the discharge or
bar the advancement of non-minority workers).
104. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 223.
105. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638-39.
106. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 526. The Administration argued that "Weber was seeking not
to leave open the door to mere 'societal discrimination' as a justifying ground. Rather, it was seeking
to solve an altogether different problem: the hardships faced by an employer who wishes to remedy
his own prior discrimination." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
Johnson (No. 85-1129).
107. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, 12-17, Johnson
(No. 85-1129).
·
108. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 539-40.
109. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 n.6.
I 10. I d. at 664 (Sea!ia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, a basic principle of constitutional interpretation is that courts should interpret statutes in such a manner as to avoid invalidating the statute on
constitutional gr9unds. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (citing cases in
which the Court has construed the National Labor Relations Act and related statutes not to permit
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The legislative history of the 1972 amendment, which extended Title
VII to state and local governments, also suggests the applicability of constitutional standards. As amendment sponsor Senator Jacob Javits
remarked:
[I]t is very important, as we are about to vote on this amendment, ... that we recognize that of all the provisions in this bill,
this has the most solemn congressional sanction, because it is based
not on the commerce clause, ... but is based on the 14th amendment. This is a paramount right which is created for all
Americans. 111
Indeed, Congress extended Title VII to public actors in response to the
difficulties state and local employees faced in attempting to vindicate in
federal court their constitutional right to equal treatment. 112 In other
words, Congress did not seek to subvert constitutional norms in publicsector Title VII actions; instead, it intended to protect public-sector employees' right to equal treatment by providing them with an effective administrative forum as well as an administrative champion. 113
Granted, the amendment's legislative history demonstrates only that
Congress intended to provide equal employment opportunity for publicsector employees. It does not foreclose the possibility that Congress
sought to accomplish this objective solely by extending distinct privatesector Title VII protections. Such an interpretation, however, is inconsistent with the Court's analysis in Weber. 114 In addition, it is unlikely
practices that would raise serious constitutional questions); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932) (noting that "it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided"). For this
reason, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), is inapposite. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6.
Although Dothard recognized congressional intent that "Title VII principles be applied to governmental and private employers alike," Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332, n, 14, in that case constitutional
standards were less intrusive than Title VII standards. See id. at 334 n.20. Dothard does not contradict the proposition that the Constitution serves as a floor in public-sector cases; instead, Dothard
establishes only that Title VII may serve as a ceiling higher than the Constitution. See id.
111. SUBCOMM1ITEE ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF
1972, at 1173 (Comm. Print 1972).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 18 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CoNG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2153 ("Although the aggrieved individual may enforce his rights directly in
the Federal district courts, this remedy ... is frequently an empty promise due to the expense and
time involved in pursuing a Federal court suit.").
113. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., lst Sess. 419-20 (1971) ("[I]t is an injustice to provide
employees in the private sector with the assistance of an agency of the Federal Government in redressing their grievances while at the same time denying similar assistance to State and local government employees.").
114. In Weber, the Court on at least eleven different occasions maintained that its decision was
limited to private affirmative action. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1565 (5th
Cir. 1984) (Gee, J., concurring). Weber thus did not merely indicate that public employers' actions
are subject to separate constitutional attack; instead, by suggesting that its explication of Title VII
extends only to private employers, Weber implicitly acknowledged that public employers are subject
to more stringent Title VII review than private employers. See United Steelworkers of America v.
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that legislation both based in and designed to further fourteenth amendment equal treatment objectives would nonetheless fail to incorporate
fourteenth amendment standards. 115 Thus, applying Title VII to public
employers inevitably raises important constitutional issues that the Johnson Court specifically chose to ignore.
The reason that Johnson eschews the constitutional issue, however,
is fairly obvious. As the majority noted, the relevant constitutional precedent is Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 116 a case that does not
bode well for the constitutionality of the Santa Clara plan. 117 Wygant
demands that voluntary affirmative action plans be both "narrowly tailored"118 and responsive to actual discrimination, rather than general societal discrimination. 119
Consequently, although a statistical
imbalance-even without a finding of intentional discrimination by a
court or other competent body-is a sufficient basis for a voluntary
group-conscious affirmative action plan, 120 Wygant's recognition of the
desirability of voluntary compliance is far from a carte blanche for public-sector affirmative action.
Johnson deviates from Wygant's standards in one critical respect.
The Johnson plan is based on a statistical imbalance caused by societal
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200, 206 n.6 (1979). For an opposing view, see Schwartz, supra note 30, at
541-42 (noting that neither the relevant provisions of Title VII nor the legislative history of the 1972
amendments draws any distinction between public and private employers).
115. Schwartz does not dispute this conclusion. See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 559. In
Schwartz's view, however, societal discrimination is an adequate basis for constitutional affirmative
action. See id. at 553-61. Consequently, Schwartz would ratchet down existing constitutional requirements so that private and public employers alike could respond to statistical imbalance caused
by societal discrimination. See id. at 542.
116. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987) (referring to Wygant
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)).
117. The Johnson Court drew an analogy between the Santa Clara Plan and the Harvard Plan
that Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978), implicitly validated. See
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638. If applicable in the employment context, Bakke would allow group status
to be a permissible factor in employment decision making. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18. Bakke,
however, places great weight on an educational institution's special interest in academic diversity,
and thus far cour!s have not extended it to other contexts. See id. at 315-17 & n.5l. Johnson's
endorsement of the Wygant standard supports this limited reading of Bakke. But see Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that Bakke
might be extended to noneducational settings).
118. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 279-80 & n.6.
1I 9. See id. at 274; see also id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reviewing Court doctrine on
the permissible scope of affirmative action beneficiaries); Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last
Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80-81 (1986) (criticizing the rule that
affirmative action is permissible "only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism," as discouraging "forward-looking justifications" such as "securing workplace peace" and "eliminating workplace caste").
120. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 (indicating the necessity of "sufficient evidence to justify the
conclusion that there has been prior discrimination"). In Justice O'Connor's view, an employer
would have sufficient evidence "if it can point to a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima
facie claim under Title VII." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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discrimination. The county offered no evidence to refute the district
court's conclusion that the county had not discriminated against women
or other minorities. 121 In fact, the majority recognized that the underrepresentation of women was caused, in part, by factors unrelated to discrimination. 122 Since the county considered factors unrelated to
discrimination, a principal purpose of the plan apparently was to advance
the county's notion of social good.
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor argued in her Johnson concurrence
that the Joyce promotion should be viewed as a remedy for apparent past
discrimination. 123 O'Connor's attempt to reconcile Title VII and constitutional norms suggests that the validity of the Johnson plan did not
hinge on the separation of Title VII and constitutional standards. The
failure of any other Justice to subscribe to this theory, however, suggests
that the Supreme Court takes seriously the line it drew in Wygant separating permissible responses to perceived actual discrimination from impermissible efforts to correct statistical imbalances caused by societal
discrimination. 124
Johnson's failure to address the constitutionality of the Santa Clara
plan at least puts, in Professor Schwartz's view, a "cloud" over voluntary
public-sector affirmative action. 125 Furthermore, the Court's characterization of the Santa Clara plan as more limited than the plan it approved
in Weber 126 suggests that Johnson does not expand the scope of permissible voluntary affirmative action under Title VII. 127 Although the
Court's reaffirmation of Weber is significant, Johnson does not break new
ground.
121. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 622 (noting that among the nondiscriminatory factors were the facts that some
jobs involved heavy labor and that the number of minorities and women who qualified for positions
requiring specialized training and experience was limited).
123. See id. at 652-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's willingness to characterize
the Santa Clara plan as remedial may become significant in future hiring cases, because O'Connor
authored the Court's opinion in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989) (plurality opinion).
124. Indeed, in a little noticed 1986 summary order, the Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's
approval of Richmond's set-aside plan for public contracts. C1ty of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,
478 U.S. 1016, 1016 (1986), vacating 779 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Devins, Don't Write Off
the Reagan Social Agenda, A.B.A. J., Feb. I, 1987, at 42, 44 (noting that the Court in Wygallt
emphasized "the desirability of voluntary compliance, [by] indicat[ing] that a statistical imbalanceeven without a finding of intentional discrimination 'by a court or other competent body'-is a
sufficient basis for a voluntary, race-conscious remedial plan"). For further discussion of Croson, see
infra notes 128-76 and accompanying text.
125. Schwartz, supra note 30, at 540-41.
126. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. As Justice Scalia argued in dissent, the
majority could have cast the Santa Clara Plan as far-reaching affirmative action. See Johnson, 480
U.S. at 658-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. Indeed, in some respects, Johnson demands a more exacting scrutiny of voluntary affirmative action than Weber. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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Richmond v. Croson: Wygant Redux
The Supreme Court Opinion

Croson illustrates the full force of Wygant's demands that voluntary
affirmative action plans be both narrowly tailored and responsive to actual discrimination. In Croson, the Supreme Court invalidated Richmond's plan to set aside thirty percent of city contracting dollars for.
black, Hispanic, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut contractors. 128 In its
analysis, the Court found that the Richmond plan failed both prongs of
the Wygant test.I29
Richmond created its plan in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1980
decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 130 In Fullilove, the Court upheld a
congressional plan setting aside for minority groups ten percent of certain federal construction grants in response to a legislative finding of societal discrimination. 131 After Fullilove, many state and local
governments enacted set-aside plans to benefit minority contractors. 132
These governments assumed that they were subject to the same standard
that the Fullilove Court applied to the federal government. 133

In Croson, however, the Supreme Court concluded that the Fullilove
model was inapplicable to state and local set asides. 134 First, Fullilove
reflected " 'appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal
branch,' " 135 and, more fundamentally, the branch that is "'expressly
charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to enforce
equal protection guarantees.' " 136 Second, the fourteenth amendment
"stemmed from a distrust of state legislative enactments based on
race,'' 137 a factor inapplicable to federal enactments. The Court therefore held that state and local set asides were subject to the same constitutional standard as other state and local affirmative action-the Wygant
standard. 138
The Croson Court had little difficulty concluding that the thirty percent set aside failed both prongs of the Wygant test. The Court found no
128. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (plurality opinion).
129. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
130. 448 u.s. 448 (1980).
131. Id. at 492.
132. See Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 454 (1987).
133. See id.
134. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 719 (1989) (pluraiity opinion).
135. Id. at 717 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472).
136. Id. at 718 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483).
137. Id. at 720.
138. See id. at 723; see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 ·11.2 (1987)
(noting that Wygallt sets forth the appropriate standard qf constitutional review in affirmative action
cases).
.
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actual discrimination because the city did not demonstrate either that its
contracting dollars were going to discriminatory firms or that there was
an underutilization of Richmond-area minority contractors and subcontractors.139 The Court considered irrelevant the fact that, although minorities comprised half of Richmond's population, minority businesses
received less than one percent of prime contracts. 140 It considered
equally irrelevant the virtual nonexistence of minority contractors in
state and local contractors' associations. 141 In the Court's view, gross
statistical disparities are of" 'little probative value'" when special qualifications are required to fill particular jobs. 142 The Court reasoned that
the dearth of minority contractors could be a result of "career and entrepreneurial choices" as well as a result of complexities in bidding procedures and bonding requirements that limit access to the construction
industry. 143 Prior congressional findings of discrimination in the construction industry and testimony before the city council that Richmond
was not immune from this discrimination also failed to impress the
Court. 144 Noting that "[t]he history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis," 145
the Court concluded that the city council did not meet its obligation to
come forward with evidence of actual discrimination in Richmond. 146
139. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-28 (plurality opinion). Despite its conclusion that there was
insufficient evidence of actual discrimination, Croson arguably relaxes the Wygant standard. In Wygant, the plurality "insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). The Croson decision, however, indicated that a literalist application of the Wygant criteria was unduly restrictive. See Croson,
109 S. Ct. at 720. Croson enables a municipality to redress discrimination committed by private
recipients of public funds. See id. (plurality opinion). Otherwise, the Court noted, cities would be
unable to respond to some publicly funded discrimination. See id.
140. See Croson,109 S. Ct. at 724 (plurality opinion).
141. See id.
142. See id. at 725 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.l3
(1977)).
143. Id. at 726.
144. See id. at 724-25.
145. Id. at 725. In support of this venerable proposition, the Court cites the Japanese internment case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). This citation is doubly ironic. First,
Korematsu was extraordinarily deferential to the government in its emplacement of a racial classification during wartime. SeeP. IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 332 (1983) (noting that in Justice Jackson·s
draft dissent, he suggested that with the adoption of the majority opinion, "we may as well say any
military order will be constitutional" (emphasis added)). Second, scholars have revealed that pernicious discrimination underlay the Japanese internment. See id. at 8 ("The historical background of
hostility directed at Orientals-first the Chinese and then the Japanese-rode on powerful currents
of nativism and prejudice," leading to "the replacement of pleas for tolerance with demands for the
evacuation and internment of this entire racial minority.").
146. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24 (plurality opinion). As Michael Rosenfeld commented in
an article otherwise quite critical of Croson: "[B]y borrowing a judicially approved federal formula
without apparent regard for relevant differences in context, the Richmond City Council opened itself
up to the charge that its preferential set-asides could not be deemed legitimately remedial even in the
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Correlatively, the city failed to satisfy Wygant's requirement that
the means be narrowly tailored because it made no inquiry into whether
participating minority firms could have suffered from discrimination by
the city. Because the thirty percent set aside failed to set geographic
criteria for minority participants and included minorities such as Eskimos and Aleuts, who were never victimized in Richmond, the Court
found that the set aside was "not linked to identified discrimination in
any way." 147 Indeed, the Court viewed the "random inclusion of racial
groups" never victimized in Richmond as "suggest[ing]" that the city's
purpose was "outright racial balancing." 14B

B.

The Opinion in Context

Many have characterized Croson as the death knell of affirmative
action. In Charles Krauthammer's words, "the status of affirmative action has been clarified. Custer's status was similarly clarified at the Little
Bighorn." 149 Croson doomsayers point to three features of the majority's
opinion to support their prediction: (1) a majority of Justices, for the
first time, explicitly endorsed strict scrutiny review in affirmative action
cases,l 50 (2) the Court limited to federal legislation Fullilove's approval
of societal discrimination as a basis for affirmative action, 151 and (3) the
Court extended Wygant through an overly rigid view of what constitutes
particularized discrimination. 152 Despite these protestations, Croson
does little more than reaffirm Wygant and Fullilove.
Wygant presaged Croson's endorsement of strict scrutiny. A plurality of Justices held in Wygant that "any racial classification 'must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest' " 153 and that the means
chosen must be " 'narrowly tailored.' " 154 Moreover, a majority of the
Johnson Court referred to Wygant as the governing constitutional stanbroadest sense of the term." Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond· Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1745 (1989).
147. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728 (plurality opinion). The Court also noted that Richmond failed to
consider either race-neutral alternatives to the set aside or standards that would ensure that minority
beneficiaries were victims of past discrimination. See id. at 728-29. These concerns, if emphasized in
future cases, could limit race-conscious relief to actual victims. Croson's reaffirmation of Wygant's
numerical model, however, and Croson's endorsements of the set aside, speak against this interpretation. See supra note 139; infra note 166.
148. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 728 (plurality opinion).
149. Krauthammer, supra note 41, at A25, col. 5.
150. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (plurality opinion).
151. See id. at 719-20.
152. See id. at 723.
153. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).
154. Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)).
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dard and thereby implicitly endorsed this formulation. 155 Of equal significance, although the formal endorsement of strict scrutiny is of
symbolic moment, strict review is not a talisman for the invalidation of
affirmative action programs. The lead opinions in Bakke, Fullilove, and
Wygant-the three constitutional affirmative action rulings before
Croson-all used strict review 156 and all concluded that governmental
actors can redress past discrimination through affirmative action. 157
Croson is much the same. Borrowing from Wygant, the Croson Court
recognized that "[w]here there is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minorit[ies] . . . and the number of such
contractors actually engaged by the locality," affirmative action is
appropriate. 158
This formulation, by using eligible minorities in the relevant labor
market as the appropriate reference, views affirmative action as properly
responsive to local ills and not to the problems of a nation. This rejection
of public employers' attempts to remedy societal discrimination finds explicit support in Justice Powell's Bakke opinion 159 and in the Wygant
plurality opinion. 16° Fullilove, moreover, does not speak to the contrary.
As Croson recognizes, Fullilove is very much couched in terms of appropriate deference to the exercise of congressional power under section five
of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 161
Croson, finally, is unexceptional in its conclusion that the thirty percent set aside was invalid because it did not respond to particularized
discrimination. Wygant refuses to recognize mere statistical disparities
as an adequate basis for affirmative action. 162 Instead, Wygant speaks of
the need for "convincing evidence ... of prior discrimination" 163 and
cautions that numeric disparities are insufficieut if "unrelated to discrim155. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 620 n.2 (1987).
156. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 273-74; Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
157. See Wygant, 476 U.S, at 274-76, 280; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 482; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10.
158. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 729 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
159. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10.
160. See Wygallt, 476 U.S. at 274.
161. See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 717-18 (plurality opinion) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472). It is
noteworthy that, on the day the Court decided Fullilove, it also granted certiorari in a case that
called into question state authority to remedy societal discrimination through affirmative action. See
Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 448 U.S. 910 (1980), cert. dismissed, 452 U.S. 105 (1981)
(dismissing the writ because the trial court had not finally determined the legal status of the challenged plan in light of the significant developments in the law). Moreover, the Wygant Court characterized Fullilove as a case about the "remedial powers of Congress." Wygallt, 476 U.S. at 272. For
a prophetic discussion of Fullilove's inapplicability to state and local set asides, see Choper, The
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action: Views from the Supreme Court, 70 KY. L.J. 1, 9 (1981).
162. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
163. /d. at 277.
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ination." 164 Affirmative action therefore must be grounded in concrete
evidence of prior discrimination. 165
In Croson, Richmond failed to produce such evidence. Instead, the
city built its case around circumstantial evidence-statistical imbalances
and conclusory statements about discrimination in the local construction
industry. 166 The apparent paucity of the city's discrimination evidence
was clear to the Supreme Court even at the time of its Wygant decision.
Shortly after Wygant, the Court directed the Fourth Circuit to reconsider its earlier approval of the Richmond set aside. 167 Not surprisingly,
the Fourth Circuit, in its remand opinion, characterized the city council's proceedings leading up to the thirty percent set aside as "betray[ing]
the very casualness about the use of racial distinctions in public enactments that Wygant warned against."t6s
.
Describing Croson as consistent with the Court's earlier pronouncement in Wygant may seem strange. After all, the. press heralded Wygant's innovation-enabling employers to correct imbalances in the
164. Id. at 276; see infra note 166.
165. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277.
166. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723 (1989) (plurality opinion).
The city, moreover, acknowledged that minority underrepresentation might also be caused by such
nonracial factors as "deficiencies in working capital, inability to meet bonding requirements, unfamiliarity with bidding procedures, and disability caused by an inadequate track record." !d. at 724.
Initially, applying Wygant in the minority set-aside context is troubling. If the city council had
relied on concrete evidence suggesting that private contractors in Richmond discriminated on the
basis of race, Wygant's emphasis on the relevant labor market would have constrained the city.
Because Wygant compares "[minority firm] representation in the public contracting market with
only the percentage of existing [minority firms] rather than with the representation of minorities in
the given population," it does not provide a remedy for the possibility that identified discrimination
has prevented minority firms "from competing with nonminority business and hence from establishing a competitive market share." Note, The Nonperpetuation of Discrimination in Public Contracting: A Justification for State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides After Wygant, 101 HA'RV.
L. REv. 1797, 1809 (1988). Although it is harsh, this limitation is understandable. Otherwise, affirmative action plans-by utilizing minority population ratios-would not be demonstrably responsive to actual discrimination and hence would not satisfy the Supreme Court's remedial demands. A
host of nonracial factors may influence the underrepresentation of minority contractors. See supra.
Recent scholarship from unlikely sources bolsters the conclusion that the Wygallt limitation is
necessary. Drew Days, the Carter Administration official who managed the Fullilove litigation, expressed strong reservations about the inexpert crafting of many set-aside programs. See Days, supra
note 132, at 458-59. Indeed, in language strikingly similar to that in Croson, Days argued that set
asides involving explicit racial classifications should be used only after "lesser alternatives were systematically and thoroughly explored prior to being rejected" and that "[participation] levels should
initially correspond to the percentage of minority contractors within the jurisdiction who are qualified and available to participate in government projects." Id. at 483-84. The so-called liberal press
also attacked set-aside programs. Articles in both The New York Times and New Republic suggested
that the set-aside programs were riddled with fraud. See Oreskes, The Set-Aside Scam, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 24, 1984, at 17, 17-18; Friendly, Road Colltractors Found to Be Evading Anti-Bias Law,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1984, at B4, col. I. These doubts about existing set-aside programs may well
have influenced the Court. The Croson majority made numerous references to the article by Days.
See Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 719, 727, 728 (plurality opinion).
167. See J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986).
168. J.A. Croson v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987).
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relevant labor market through affirmative action-as "a significant victory for civil rights groups." 169 In sharp contrast, the press has characterized Croson as a civil rights debacle. 170 As the earlier case analyses
suggest, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
Wygant's reformulation is a compromise between competing principles. If it responds to disparities related to discrimination, an affirmative
action plan can go forward without a contemporaneous finding of discrimination. 171 At the same time, because the relevant labor market is
the point of comparison, there exists "a strong basis in evidence ... that
remedial action [is] necessary." 172
Although Croson emphasizes this narrowing feature of Wygant, it
explicitly endorses Wygant's compromise. In fact, Croson cites with approval an Ohio set aside "relying on [the] percentage of minority businesses in the State compared to [the] percentage of state purchasing
contracts awarded." 173 In other words, the problem with Richmond's
plan may not be affirmative action in general or even set asides in particular, but the sloppiness and arbitrariness of the thirty percent set
aside. 174 As Joshua Smith, a spokesperson for minority contractors,
commented, "The ruling itself should have no major impact; the justices
simply said that a local jurisdiction will have to do its homework." 175
Croson therefore breaks little new ground. Its reaffirmation of Wy169. High Court Ruling Signals Support for Affirmative Action, Wash. Post, May 20, 1986, at
AI, col. 6; see also High Court Bars a LayoffMethod Favoring Blacks, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1986, at
AI, col. 4 (asserting that "the Justices' reasoning [in Wygant] broadly supported some uses of affirmative action by government employers").
170. See Frost, Strong Tool Lost in Fight Against Continual Patterns of Excluding Minorities,
L.A. Times, Feb. 1, 1989, § 2 (Metro), at 7, col 1; supra notes 37-42, 149 and accompanying text.
171. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 476 U.S. 267, 289 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 728-29 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(striking down the challenged quota system because it was maintained for administrative convenience rather than for remedying prior discrimination).
172. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277; see also Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725 (plurality opinion) (stating that
"the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory exclusion must be the
number of minorities qualified to undertake the particular task").
173. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 725-26 (citing Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir.
1983)).
174. Keip is especially instructive. Like the Richmond Plan, the Ohio set aside was predicated
upon a determination that state contracting dollars were going to discriminatory private firms. Ohio
Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 171 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967)). Significantly, however, the Ohio set aside-although based on disparities between the percentage of eligible minority firms and the percentage of minority contracting
dollars-was far from precise. The set aside allocated a greater percentage of state dollars than the
percent of minority firms, see id. at 169, 171, but in determining the relevant market share of minority firms, the Ohio set aside considered only the gross number of minority businesses and paid no
attention to firm size, see id. at 171. In short, under the Ohio set aside, states and municipalities
retained fairly broad discretion over their contractor dollars.
175. Lawrence, Firms Weigh Court Ruling on Set-Asides, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1989. at Fl. col.
4.
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gant is important because it crystallizes the standard of review for affirmative action cases. Although this crystallization is of some practical and
great symbolic importance, it should not be overstated. In fact, by recognizing that a city is empowered to use affirmative action to redress some
forms of private discrimination within its jurisdiction, Croson loosens
Wygant's demand that affirmative action respond only to discrimination
"by the governmental unit involved." 176 Although affirmative action
proponents may find this loosening a thin silver lining in an ominous
grey cloud, the possible impact of Croson should not be overgeneralized.

IV.

Conclusion: Affirmative Action After Reagan

The boundaries of permissible affirmative action remain uncertain.
Commentators who argue that the 1986 and 1987 cases represent sweeping approval of race-conscious hiring and promotion schemes fail to consider how these cases relate to each other; viewed as a mosaic, the cases
leave unanswered many questions about the scope of permissible affirmative action. In the same way, Croson pundits overstate their claims.
Croson does not undermine Wygant's promise of expanding the sweep of
affirmative action.
The indeterminacy of Reagan-era affirmative action rulings reveals
some important lessons about Court rulings on highly charged political
·issues. First, as Justice Jackson suggested in the Steel Seizure case, the
Court moves incrementally; hence, readers should exercise caution
before attaching too much importance to any opinion. 177 Second, the
perceived significance of Supreme Court rulings is defined, in part, by the
political milieu in which they arise. Although many Presidents seek to
further their own social policies through litigation, 178 the Reagan Justice
Department encountered a firestorm of criticism because its views on affirmative action and other divisive issues were a substantial departure
from those of its predecessors. Consequently, Supreme Court decisions
176. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274; see supra note 119 and accompanying text. Compare City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 720 (1989) (plurality opinion) (declaring that in order
to justify a racial classification, a showing must be made of past discrimination by the specific governmental entity making the classification) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (explaining that a state or
local government has the authority to remedy past discrimination in the private sector within that
government's jurisdiction).
177. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
178. See J. CALIFANO, A PRESIDENTIAL NATION 168-69, 173-74 (1975); G. EDWARDS & S.
WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 402-03 (1985); cf. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 1787-1984, at 144 (R. Bland, T. Hindson & J. Deltason 5th rev. ed. 1984) (noting the
President's power to select among the laws to be "faithfully executed" and citing the Sherman Act as
an example): P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND MATERIALS 429 (1988) (noting the Executive's prosecutorial discretion in enforcement of criminal laws).
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on affirmative action, an issue normally with high stakes, took on added
symbolic and practical importance.
Whether the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court will read
these decisions as narrowly as this Essay urges is another matter. Until
the courts clarify which path they will take, however, opponents and proponents of affirmative action must prepare for future battles.
In many respects, future battles should be less intense. Although
many questions remain unanswered, Reagan efforts to limit Title VII
remedies and constitutional relief exclusively to victims of discrimination
have surely suffered a stinging rebuke. Johnson reaffirmed Weber; 179
Sheet Metal Workers' refused to extend Stotts; 180 and both Croson and
Wygant recognize that affirmative action can be predicated on minority
underrepresentation. 181 Moreover, in several of the 1986 and 1987 cases,
the Supreme Court ridiculed the Reagan Administration for departing
from past governmental efforts in support of affirmative action. 182 As a
result, the Reagan Administration abandoned its initiatives to challenge
affirmative action hiring and promotion plans in fifty-one
municipalities. 183
Over the past few years, moreover, there has been burgeoning support for affirmative action from private industry and state and local government. Admittedly, this support may be economic. For example,
some employers "voluntarily" adopt affirmative action plans to stave off
threatened litigation. This support will nonetheless chill governmental
efforts to limit nonvictim relief.
Those concerned with affirmative action, therefore, should attend
closely to the Court's shifts and signals in its coming terms. The unsettled state of the doctrine indicates that significant developments may be
heralded in ways far more subtle than shouting.
179. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 518
n.9 (1986) (noting that the EEOC had not joined the brief for the United States); Local 28 of the
Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Assoc. v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 n.24 (1986) (commenting on the
"curious position" of the EEOC in challenging the numerical nonwhite membership goals that the
district court established for the union, because in 1975 the EEOC had asked the court to order
numerical goals and implement ratios).
183. Following the Supreme Court's opinion in Stotts, the Administration urged fifty-one jurisdictions to use Stotts as a mechanism for foregoing their affirmative action obligations. See Affirmative Action Revisions Resisted, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1985, at AI, col. 3.
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